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Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions

  • Li Sha Huang*
  • , Minming Li
  • , Bo Zhang
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider a social optimization model of pricing scheme in single-minded auctions, in cases where Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. We are interested in the maximization of the ratio, R, of happy bidders over all agents, in a feasible allocation-pricing scheme. We show NP-hardness of the optimization problem, establish lower and upper bounds of R, as well as develop greedy algorithms to approximate the optimal value of R.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)390-398
Number of pages9
JournalTheoretical Computer Science
Volume337
Issue number1-3
DOIs
StatePublished - 9 Jun 2005
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Combinatorial auction
  • Walrasian equilibrium

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