Abstract
We consider a social optimization model of pricing scheme in single-minded auctions, in cases where Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. We are interested in the maximization of the ratio, R, of happy bidders over all agents, in a feasible allocation-pricing scheme. We show NP-hardness of the optimization problem, establish lower and upper bounds of R, as well as develop greedy algorithms to approximate the optimal value of R.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 390-398 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Theoretical Computer Science |
| Volume | 337 |
| Issue number | 1-3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 9 Jun 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Combinatorial auction
- Walrasian equilibrium
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