@inproceedings{c3bd19ec382f4b83ae55724a091b14d6,
title = "Group-fair Facility Location Games with Externalities",
abstract = "We study facility location games with externalities where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups. The cost of an agent is affected by the facility location and their group members. The goal is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately optimize group-fair objectives while eliciting the agents' locations truthfully. We consider two types of group interactions: competitive and collaborative, and two group-fair objectives, minimizing the maximum total group cost and minimizing the maximum average group cost. For each scenario, we analyze classic mechanisms, presenting their approximation ratios, and introduce new mechanisms that achieve improved approximation ratios. Additionally, we establish tight lower bounds for each setting, demonstrating that our mechanisms are the best possible.",
keywords = "Externality, Facility Location, Group Fairness",
author = "Minming Li and Cheng Peng and Ying Wang and Houyu Zhou",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2025 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org).; 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025 ; Conference date: 19-05-2025 Through 23-05-2025",
year = "2025",
language = "英语",
series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",
publisher = "International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)",
pages = "2615--2617",
editor = "Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Sanmay Das and Ann Nowe",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025",
address = "美国",
}