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Strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio

  • City University of Hong Kong
  • Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
  • University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
  • CAS - Institute of Computing Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 1 + 2a, where a is the approximation ratio of the offline optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, we improve the earlier best ratio of n/2 + 1 [Yuan et al., 2016] to a ratio of 2.75.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2020
EditorsChristian Bessiere
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages238-245
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241165
StatePublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes
Event29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2020 - Yokohama, Japan
Duration: 1 Jan 2021 → …

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2021-January
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2020
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityYokohama
Period1/01/21 → …

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