TY - JOUR
T1 - Fast Unauthorized Energy Decryption for Frequency-Varying Wireless Power Without Additional Sensor
AU - Wang, Hui
AU - Tashakor, Nima
AU - Tian, Xiaoyang
AU - Schotten, Hans D.
AU - Goetz, Stefan M.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2004-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - With the popularity of wireless charging, energy access protection and cybersecurity are gaining importance, especially in public places. Currently, the most common energy encryption method uses frequency and associated impedance variation. However, we have proven that this method is not reliable, since a hacker can detect the changing frequency and adjust the compensation. Still, the previously presented system needed time to follow the updated frequency, while encryption systems may vary the frequency faster to avoid energy theft. Furthermore, the previous system required an additional sensor coil. To solve these problems, we optimized the attack and the associated system, which can intrude and steal energy within 200 µs. The key is the elimination of the time-consuming maximum receiver current regulation. Also, we use the main receiving coil rather than any additional sensor antenna to detect the magnetic field. Thus, the new hardware is even simpler. A simulation model and experimental results demonstrate the fast response speed of the attack on encrypted wireless power and steal 65% of the power. Overall, the applicability of the attack is highly improved and leaves less room for hardening the encryption. The results demonstrate that energy access protection needs to be given great attention.
AB - With the popularity of wireless charging, energy access protection and cybersecurity are gaining importance, especially in public places. Currently, the most common energy encryption method uses frequency and associated impedance variation. However, we have proven that this method is not reliable, since a hacker can detect the changing frequency and adjust the compensation. Still, the previously presented system needed time to follow the updated frequency, while encryption systems may vary the frequency faster to avoid energy theft. Furthermore, the previous system required an additional sensor coil. To solve these problems, we optimized the attack and the associated system, which can intrude and steal energy within 200 µs. The key is the elimination of the time-consuming maximum receiver current regulation. Also, we use the main receiving coil rather than any additional sensor antenna to detect the magnetic field. Thus, the new hardware is even simpler. A simulation model and experimental results demonstrate the fast response speed of the attack on encrypted wireless power and steal 65% of the power. Overall, the applicability of the attack is highly improved and leaves less room for hardening the encryption. The results demonstrate that energy access protection needs to be given great attention.
KW - Wireless power transfer
KW - access encryption
KW - energy safety
KW - energy stream cipher
KW - energy theft
KW - frequency hopping
KW - microsecond operation
KW - power cybersecurity
KW - power encryption
KW - power hacking
KW - unauthorized energy harvesting
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105018835448
U2 - 10.1109/TCSI.2025.3600663
DO - 10.1109/TCSI.2025.3600663
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:105018835448
SN - 1549-8328
VL - 73
SP - 685
EP - 695
JO - IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
IS - 1
ER -