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Mechanism design for ontology alignment

  • City University of Hong Kong
  • University of Liverpool

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节会议稿件同行评审

摘要

The aim of the ontology alignment problem is to find meaningful correspondences between two ontologies represented as collections of entities. This problem can be modelled as a novel mechanism design problem on an edge-weighted bipartite graph, where each side of the graph holds each agent's private entities, and the objective is to maximise the agents' social welfare. Having studied implementation in dominant strategies with and without payments, we report on findings that for truthful mechanisms, these problems need to be solved optimally. We also study greedy allocation rules with a first-price payment rule, and implementation in pure, mixed & Bayesian Nash equilibria, and have found tight bounds on the price of anarchy and stability.

源语言英语
主期刊名16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
编辑Edmund Durfee, Michael Winikoff, Kate Larson, Sanmay Das
出版商International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
1587-1588
页数2
ISBN(电子版)9781510855076
出版状态已出版 - 2017
已对外发布
活动16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, 巴西
期限: 8 5月 201712 5月 2017

出版系列

姓名Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
3
ISSN(印刷版)1548-8403
ISSN(电子版)1558-2914

会议

会议16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
国家/地区巴西
Sao Paulo
时期8/05/1712/05/17

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